CU Course on Hegel, Part 2a
The Fake “Other”
The
fundamental question of philosophy is the relation between human and
environment, or in other words, between mind and matter, or in philosophical
terms, between Subject and Object.
Some
philosophers, including the so-called “Post-Modernists” of our times, have
considered that humans are products of circumstances, or effects of chemical
processes, and do not have free will. In this view, human society is driven by
forces outside its own consciousness, and beyond its control. These
philosophers have consequently sometimes declared “The Death of the Subject”,
as if to say that all ideas of free will, and of the conscious, self-propelling
human development know as Humanism, are out of date now; and this view suits
the bourgeois class at this time.
James
Heartfield’s 2002 book “The
‘Death of the Subject’ explained” deals with many different
anti-Humanist theories and concludes:
“Like Mark Twain’s death, reports of the ‘Death
of the Subject’ are exaggerated. They have to be. The fulcrum point on which
society turns is the freely willing subject. For all of the attempts to imagine
a world without subjects, but only processes and objective forces, no developed
society is conceivable without rationally choosing individuals at its core.”
In our study
of G W F Hegel we will have to return to the question of the relation between
the Subject and the Object, because it is central to Hegel’s contribution to
philosophy in general and to Marxism in particular. Hegel took this relation
and made it dialectical; in other words, he showed how its development happens.
But for the
time being we are still concerned with what Hegel is not, and we will use
Chapter 3 of Heartfield’s book (a downloadable file is linked below) to show why
the by-now-commonplace concept of “The Other”, which appears in newspaper and
magazine articles all the time, should not be attributed to Hegel, as much as
Hegel does write about “the other” in his books.
Hegel’s
other is another other, and this can be seen from Heartfield’s writing. Heartfield
gives the 20th-century history of this confusion, and he is not the
only writer to have done so.
The vulgar
concept of “The Other” is a fixed, alien and threatening presence, real or
imagined. In this imaginary framework, individuals and societies are believed
to have their behaviour affected by fear of “The Other”, perhaps unjustly. So
for example, in the example of Edward Said’s “Orientalism” that Heartfield
begins with, Said’s complaint is found to be that the Muslims are wrongly
treated as “Other”, when they are not actually “Other”. The Muslims are
unjustly “Other”-ised, according to Said.
From a
philosophical point of view Said could have better held that there is no such
thing as “The Other” in this fixed sense.
Heartfield then
goes further back to show that the origin of the concept of “unbridgeable opposition between Self and
Other” is Paris, France, in the 1930s and 1940s, in the persons of
Alexandre Kojève, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, among others.
Kojève imported and popularized a fake version of Hegel’s philosophy, and it
took on a life of its own, even penetrating down to popular bourgeois
journalism.
We will
look at Hegel’s writing, including the famous Master-Slave dialectic, and we
will see that, as with Ubuntu, the Hegelian Self and Other are not in “unbridgeable”
opposition but are instead intimately linked, to the extent that they are the
condition for each other’s development.
Please download and read this text via the link:
Further reading:
The System of
Ethical Life, 1802-3, Hegel (521 words)
Hegel
Myths and Legends, Introduction, 1996, Stewart (6643 words)
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